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ABSTRACT

There is a fierce ideological struggle between two warring camps:
those who rally against expansive government and those who support it.
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Clearly, the correct balance must be struck between the extremes of legislative
over-invasiveness and the frightening total absence of legal structure. This
paper articulates a framework that allows for legislative parsimony-a way to
scale back state law in a way that avoids lurching to unnecessary extremes. I
assume the libertarian premise that law should strive to encroach as minimally
as possible upon social order, yet I argue that we must do this in a highly
selective fashion, employing a range of legislative techniques. I call this
approach legislative minimalism. The strength of legislative minimalism is its
pragmatic flexibility: different situations will allow for different degrees of
minimalism. The paper creates a taxonomy of legislative strategies, outlining
five distinct strategies. This taxonomy provides a conceptual foundation to help
guide policymakers faced with the question of how best to legislate-or more
accurately, how much to legislate.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sometimes the most effective form of action is no action at all-or at
least as little of it as possible. Consider gardening. The experienced gardener
knows that over-gardening can stifle growth. Different situations call for
different degrees of tending: sometimes all that is needed is a bit of trimming,
sometimes a little invasive weeding, and occasionally what is required is
uprooting the entire plant. The trick is in knowing precisely how much
"interference" is needed: too little and one's garden will become a disordered
mess; too much and one's garden will wither away and die. What is true for the
natural ordering of plants is true for the natural ordering of society. Most social
order is a natural process.' Imposed social order, that is order created and
imposed through the legislative authority and coercive mechanisms of the state,
is but the formal tip of a colossal iceberg.2 Beneath this surface lies a deep
ocean of social norms and customary rules that structure society. 3 I will refer to

Indeed, the highest levels of social order are, in fact, found in the insect world, such as with

ant colonies and wasp nests.

THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORDER:

A

READER

3 (Michael Hechter &

Christine Home eds., 2d ed. 2009). I use Jon Elster's definition of social order here: stable,
predictable behavioral patterns and general cooperative behavior. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT
OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 1 (1989).
2

Throughout the discussion, the term "the state" is meant to include not only administrative

and legislating bodies but also judge-made law.
3
Indeed, most social order is maintained not through state-enforced law but through social
norms. Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, CompetingNorms and Social Evolution: Is the
Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2027, 2027-28 (2001); see also, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspectivefrom the Legal Academy, in SOCIAL
NORMs 35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (discussing how social norms arise,
persist, and change).
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this broadly as customary social order (I use this term henceforth). 4 It would be
a mistake to underestimate the vitality and significance of customary social
order: throughout most of our species' history, custom, not formal law, has
preserved social order.' Customary social ordering is an unremitting process,
surging upwards through the myriad cracks of social intercourse. It is
undesigned order-the consequence of social interaction. While the footprint of
imposed legal order is large, it dwarfs in comparison to the vast social
complexity that remains completely untouched by the instruments of formal
law. At the end of the day, the vast majority of social patterning is neither
designed nor regulated.
When one begins to think along these lines, the question that invariably
presents itself is: to what extent should formal law interfere with the natural
mechanics of social order at all? Clearly, in some areas it intrudes quite a lot, in
others, very little. Just how much of society should be subject to the hand of
law rather than left to the natural ordering force of custom? Do we want the
state to regulate every facet of social existence: family life, sexual practices?
What if, for example, the aggregate productivity of society could be
substantially improved if each of us slept at least eight hours a night? Would
the state then be justified in legislating a societal bedtime? 7 On the other hand,
there are social dynamics that clearly require massive doses of regulation: black
markets, organized crime, racial discrimination, etc. The question of how far
law should extend itself goes to the very heart of our relationship with
government for it is through law that the state asserts the most direct and most
powerful influence over our lives. Law is like the corrective hand of a gardener:
sometimes it is needed to save the life of a plant, to nurture and sustain it, but
equally, it needs to know when to pull back and defer to natural processes. For
over-gardening, overwatering, and over-fertilizing the soil-all this will also
4
Customary social order, as it is used here, refers to fixed social patterning on various levels
of complexity, from simple norms of conduct (e.g. queuing norms) to quite intricate systems of
order (e.g. customary international rules of war). Throughout, I juxtapose this with "imposed
social order," i.e. social order created through formal law. The terms social patterning, social
ordering, self-ordering systems, customary system, or even just system are used here
interchangeably with customary social order. Friedrich Hayek uses the term spontaneous order.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 160 (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]. This could also be used here.
5
See David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW:

See F. A.

151, 158 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine &
James B. Murphy eds., 2007).
6
I have discussed the self-ordering nature of customary law elsewhere, arguing that it may
be strategically manipulated to serve public policy ends. See Bryan H. Druzin, PlantingSeeds of
Order: How the State Can Create, Shape, and Use Customary Law, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 373
(2014).
7
It is undeniable that reproduction patterns have clear, large-scale societal implications.
Could state regulation of such patterns be justified? China's one-child policy is one answer.
Many disagree.
LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
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kill a plant. As the skilled hand of the gardener must be measured, so should
the hand of law. It should not overreach, yet at the same time, it should not fail
to extend itself where necessary.
The position that law overreaches has been widely argued. Indeed, the
idea has great purchase in certain circles. Anarchists, libertarians, conservative
economists, and some legal scholars fervently contend that too much social
regulation undermines the productivity, potential, and even the basic freedom
of the very society it seeks to regulate. 8 These voices call to restrain (or with
respect to anarchists destroy) the hand of law. This paper takes these claims
seriously. The discussion that follows is sympathetic to their position (albeit in
its technical rather than ideological form). 9 For the purposes of this paper, I
take the general argument as already valid. My job, as I set it out for myself, is
not really to make a case for why we should minimize regulation (I mostly
assume this leg of the argument); the focus of this paper, rather, is how to go
about doing it. If we take the minimalist position as legitimate, the question
arises: what are we to do about it? This question lies at the center of a fierce
ideological struggle between two warring camps: those who rally against
expansive government and those who support it. Clearly, the correct balance
must be struck between legislative over-invasiveness on the one hand and a
frightening total absence of formal legal structure on the other. Put simply, this
paper proposes to split the difference. It articulates a framework that allows for
legislative parsimony-a way to scale back state law in a way that avoids
lurching to unnecessary extremes. My thesis in a nutshell is this: wherever
feasible, we should strive to encroach as minimally as possible upon customary
social order, yet this may be done in a highly selective, strategic fashion,
employing a range of legislative techniques. I call this approach legislative
minimalism.10 The strength of legislative minimalism is in its pragmatic

8
As this literature is vast, I refer the reader to the more prominent theorists in this vein.
While not a comprehensive list, see the work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Lysander Spooner
(early anarchism); Murray Rothbard and Robert Nozick (libertarianism); Friedrich Hayek and
Milton Friedman (economics); and Richard Epstein and Robert Cooter (law). See also the
literature on overcriminalization. For a good introduction to this literature, see Sanford H.
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization; More on Overcriminalization; and The Use of
CriminalSanctions in EnforcingEconomic Regulations, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN
THE CRIMINAL LAW 21, 21-61 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1987).

9
I draw this distinction because anarchists and libertarians often make a normative argument
against the state, contending that the state is a constraint on personal liberty and is either entirely
or largely illegitimate. I do not wish to engage in such arguments here. In fact, I fear that such
normative claims only cloud the issue. See infra Part II.D (discussing the hazards of ideology).
10 The term "legislative minimalism" has been employed before yet in a somewhat ad hoc
manner connoting various meanings. As such, some clarification is needed. Legislative
minimalism as understood here is wherever the state, to whatever degree, strategically
incorporates customary social order. This may be contrasted with the concept of legislative
maximalism where the state disregards the natural patterning of spontaneous order and instead
simply imposes top-down legal order. For scholarship where the term has previously appeared
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flexibility. Different situations will allow for different degrees of minimalism.
As such, there is not a single strategy of legislative minimalism; rather, there
are several. This paper creates a taxonomy of strategies, outlining five ways in
which legislative minimalism may be applied. Taken together, these five
strategies provide a conceptual foundation to guide policymakers faced with the
question of how best to legislate-or more to the point, how much to legislate.
Which strategy is most appropriate should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
The trick is in knowing how, like the gardener, the state can skillfully manage
customary social ordering and just what dose of minimalism is appropriate.
The hand of law will always extend somewhere along a continuum of
intrusion. This is unavoidable. The question is merely in choosing the most
appropriate degree of intervention. This being the case, it becomes that much
more imperative that we articulate a clear, conceptually rigorous framework for
dealing with customary patterning. The contribution of this paper is that it
provides such a framework-it provides clarity. In actual fact, the law already
deals heavily in customary order, employing different degrees of regulatory
intrusion as it builds upon and modifies pre-existing patterns of social order.
Yet this is not done in a consistent or coherent fashion. The taxonomy this
paper constructs systematizes this entire process. Armed with this conceptual
framework, lawmakers will be clear from the outset as to what legislative
approach is most suitable to the task at hand, and this clarity will guide them in
more skillfully formulating legislation (or not formulating legislation as the
case may be). What is currently lacking is a lucid set of instructions to help
lawmakers determine where exactly the line of legislative intrusion should be
drawn. It is thus important to have at our disposal a clear and comprehensive
framework for minimalism even if that means we find sometimes that
minimalism is not at all what is needed.
My argument proceeds in three parts. Part II begins by clarifying some
foundational assumptions made in the paper and then briefly lays out the case
for minimalism. Yet this is not the focus of the paper. Parts III and IV is where
the paper offers a fresh contribution to the literature. Part III articulates a
framework for legislative minimalism, creating a detailed taxonomy of
strategies. Part IV then further clarifies this framework, discussing how these
strategies are in fact already at work within the realm of contract. Indeed, in

conveying extremely divergent meanings, see, for example, Ian C. Bartrum, Same-Sex Marriage
in the Heartland. The Case for Legislative Minimalism in Crafting Religious Exemptions, 108
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 8 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/
bartrum.pdf (suggesting that the Iowa legislature should allow the courts to craft religious
exemptions regarding same-sex marriage); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of "Too Much Law," 80
FORDHAM L. REv. 1585 (2012) (claiming that federal laws and regulations are too numerous).
This should also not be confused with "judicial minimalism," a term popularized by Cass
Sunstein that relates to a form of constitutional interpretation. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
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that the state has traditionally employed a "light touch" approach in contract,
the law of contract is a terrific case study in how legislative minimalism may be
applied across the full spectrum of law.
II. THE CASE FOR M1NIMALISM

A. Assumptions and StartingPoints
This paper embraces certain assumptions and starting points that need
to be made clear from the outset. First, as I said in the introduction, for the
purposes of the discussion, I take the claims of those who call to shrink the size
of law seriously. This assumption is open to attack on both normative and
factual grounds. However, let me preemptively defend against such criticisms. I
do this not because the argument for minimalism is closed to debate; rather, I
do this because this is not really the paper's focus. My focus, rather, is in
crafting a framework to effectuate minimalism that is nuanced, strategic, and
avoids lurching to unnecessary extremes. Thus, I take as my starting point that
we do indeed want to shrink the size of law and then offer a way to get there.
As such, I am laboring under two assumptions, the first descriptive and the
second normative. The first is that imposed social order is generally more
vulnerable to inefficiencies (for reasons I will explain). The second assumption,
which flows from the first, is that we should, therefore, only impose order
where it is absolutely necessary." Both these assumptions relate to a familiar
controversy (the role of government), and the paper does not add anything
startlingly new on this front-it is taken as a working premise that the technical
argument for minimalism holds merit. Rather, the contribution of this paper
resides mostly in Parts III and IV where a clear taxonomy for legislative
minimalism is set out, scrutinized, and dissected.
A general theme emerges from the discussion: wherever it is feasible,
legislative minimalism should be preferred over its opposite, legislative
maximalism. This is because each time we successfully minimize the state's
intrusion into natural social patterning, we arguably reduce the risk of messing
things up. Hence, when faced with the choice whether or not to take legislative
action, we should err on the side of caution and favor minimalism. Yet it is
important to note that just because a system of customary social order arises
bottom-up, this is no guarantee that it is optimal or even desirable. 12 It would
be profoundly naive to assume that customary social ordering is always
optimal. Such order may be grossly inefficient, unjust, or may simply stand to

I
Indeed, this is how I read Hayek. The basic premise of his work is thus embraced here.
12 Yet, arguably, its decentralized, organic genesis does give it a certain consistent advantage
over its top-down competition in that such complexity is better suited to spontaneous processes.
See infra Part II.B for a fuller discussion of this under the concept of design efficiency.
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benefit from some minor tinkering. 13 Just how much tinkering is needed will
vary. I employ a very parsimonious definition of efficiency: "efficient" simply
means that the system of order is able to effectively achieve whatever purpose
the system is geared to achieve. ' 4 As I use it here, there are thus degrees of
efficiency: the more effectively a system can achieve its purpose, the more we
can say it is efficient. For example, the more a system of traffic order can
achieve an uncongested traffic flow, the more it may be said to be efficient. If a
system achieves its purpose but this can be improved upon (i.e. traffic
congestion could be further reduced), then it suffers from inefficiency. In using
the term, I do not necessarily mean strict economic conceptions of efficiency
such as allocative efficiency, Pareto efficiency, distributive efficiency, or
productive efficiency (although it may certainly include any or all of these).
Perhaps another way to think of this that may be useful is in terms of
"effectiveness" or "efficacy."
The taxonomy the paper constructs offers a new, or at least clearer,
approach to an old debate and in this respect may prove interesting. What
legislative minimalism entails are degrees of minimalism that span a continuum
reflecting the level of involvement versus disengagement; it relates to the
degree to which top-down law "intrudes" upon customary social order. The
approach is unique in that it proposes graduated degrees of minimalism and
articulates specific strategies to effectuate this. As such, it assumes a less
dogmatic attitude towards the role of government.' 5 Robert Nozick once
remarked that "[t]he fundamental question of political philosophy, one that
precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there
should be any state at all."' 6 For our purposes we can tweak this slightly: the
most fundamental question for us, one that precedes even how formal law
should be organized, is whether there should be any formal law at all. My thesis
is that this is not an all-or-nothing proposition. It is a question that may be
answered with different intensities of formal law on a case-by-case basis

While I better define "inefficiency" below, as for the term "unjust," I do not proffer any
definition. The term unjust as it is used here may mean any number of things depending upon a
society's particular goals and objectives. This may range from equitable resource distribution to
maximization of productivity. For our purposes, what a society deems as just is of relevance only
to the extent that such conceptions will influence what is seen to be the purpose of a system,
shaping our determinations of efficiency. For example, in the case of traffic order, its purpose
may be fluid traffic flow, yet it may just as well be safe traffic flow. Whether a system is judged
efficient will depend upon the purpose we assign to it, and this is unavoidably bound up with
normative views. Where normative concepts influence our understanding of efficiency, they will
determine the policy decision whether to intervene and to what extent.
14 And without producing unanticipated negative externalities.
15 This can be thought of as a "thin" model of minimalism in that it permits degrees of topdown law from the lightest kinds of minimalism to the heaviest forms of legal maximalism, if
indeed that is what is required.
13

16

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcity, STATE, AND UTOPIA 4 (1974).
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depending on the social pattern we are dealing with. Before wading deeper into
our discussion, I shall briefly outline the case for why legislative minimalism is
something beneficial we should seek to implement on a policy level. However,
as this position is assumed to already hold merit, I do this really more to
contextualize the discussion than to advance specific arguments for
minimalism. What follows is the standard technical argument for minimalism.
With this in mind, let us consider some of the benefits that may be gleaned
from a minimalist approach.
B. The Benefits of Minimalism
It is important that we are clear that when we speak of customary social
order we are in fact discussing something that can take a variety of forms.
Customary social order can range from simple norms of conduct (e.g. students'
self-assigning seats in a classroom or queuing norms) to extremely complex
and intricate systems of normative order (e.g. the driving norms of a thirdworld city or the customary rules of international armed conflict).17 Regardless
of the form it takes, however, customary social order offers some practical
advantages over imposed social order. Because customary social order arises
from an active discourse between parties rather than from being imposed from
above, the social rules that it produces are often more efficient,1 8 robust,

The machinery of customary social ordering has been widely studied: various mechanisms
help foster and sustain its emergence. I have explored this theme elsewhere. See generally Bryan
H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a Form of
Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423 (2014) (positing that positive duties help sustain
commercial contracts and international treaties by establishing trust through repeated rounds of
signaling). See also Druzin, supra note 6 (discussing the self-ordering nature of customary law
and arguing that it may be strategically manipulated to serve public policy ends). The
conclusions of game theorists, evolutionary biologists, legal anthropologists, and sociologists all
fall along similar lines. Repeated interaction allows for the possibility of very sophisticated forms
of coordination without third-party enforcement because the shadow of future encounters can
support a cooperative equilibrium. Given sufficient repeated interaction, individuals can rely on
the threat of retaliation and reputational costs as informal enforcement mechanisms to encourage
rule compliance. On the carrot side of the ledger, the element of reciprocal benefit that often
comes with repeated interaction reinforces such arrangements, cementing the social rules that
emerge. Much of the game theory literature addresses the impact of repeated games as a solution
to the prisoner's dilemma. I refer the reader to the foundational work regarding this idea, see
Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 Sci. 1390 (1981);
Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306
(1981). The take-away point here is that customary social order is a naturally occurring
phenomenon. So long as the correct ingredients are present, it may manifest.
18
But see H. Peyton Young, Social Norms 6 (Univ. of Oxford Dep't of Econ. Discussion
17

Paper Series, Paper No. 307, 2007), available at http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/
working-papers/paper307.pdf (pointing out that many social norms are demonstrably
inefficient).
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internalized,1 9 and self-enforcing. Where the rules prove self-enforcing, the
enforcement burden on the state may be lightened. 20 This alone is a significant
advantage. Yet the central benefit of customary social order over that of topdown law is that it solves the problem of informational complexity.
Informational complexity is the idea that when a high level of complexity is
reached in any given system, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, for one individual to know or process all the data relevant to a
decision.21 This is a serious problem, one to which lawmaking is extremely
vulnerable. The sheer complexity of law, a vast system of evolving rules and
interrelated concepts, can be so difficult to grasp in its entirety that it often
leads to design errors that produce unanticipated negative externalities. Put
simply, it can cause us to make bad law. We can term this design error." It is a
working premise of this paper that design error abounds in the law.
It is, as Friedrich A. Hayek contends, an extraordinarily difficult task to
design organized complexity because it is impossible for one mind to grasp all

19
That is, there arises an underlying sense of universal duty to follow the norm-the "ought
to" in a Humean sense. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 335 (1739). When a
norm is internalized, it gives rise to the feeling that it is implicitly valid. As Eric Posner says,
"[P]eople bound by [norms] feel an emotional or psychological compulsion to obey the norms;
norms have moral force." Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1709 (1996). At a more advanced stage, the process can achieve the standing of
opiniojuris,the belief that a particular action carries a legal obligation.
20
The reader should note that the focus here is not upon self-enforcement. Self-enforcement
is well-studied, particularly within the field of evolutionary game theory. Yet, with the exception
of the strategy of Non-interference, this important aspect of customary social order is left out of
the discussion.
21 This idea formed the better part of the life's work of the economist Friedrich A. Hayek. For
his early and perhaps best-known work on the subject, see F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM:

TEXT AND DOCUMENTS 95 (Bruce Caldwell ed. 2007) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE ROAD TO
SERFDOM]; see also 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 15 (1973) (discussing the impossibility

of knowing and using all relevant facts) [hereinafter HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY]. It
is an extension of the economic calculation problem proposed by Ludwig von Mises, which
decries the use of centralized planning in place of a market-based allocation of the factors of
production.

See

LUDWIG

VON

MISES,

ECONOMIC

CALCULATION

IN

THE

SOCIALIST

COMMONWEALTH (1920) (discussing the increase in specialization and complexity of society);
see also JOHN C. W. TOUCHIE, HAYEK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS FOR A MINIMALIST

APPROACH TO LAW 94-95 (2005).

22
Design error is measured by the inability of a system of order, due to structural-design
reasons, to effectively achieve its purpose without producing unanticipated negative externalities
(system efficiency). The more it is unable to do this, the more we can say the system suffers from
design error. Take an artificial heart as an example. If its purpose is to pump a sufficient flow of

blood through the body to keep the recipient alive, vigorous, and in good health, then it can be
said to suffer from design error if (1) the patient dies, if (2) the recipient lives but is not in a
vigorous condition, or if (3) the patient lives but, say, develops serious blood clots (unanticipated
negative externalities). In this respect, design error is a matter of degree.
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the relevant information.23 The problem of informational complexity was
Hayek's central critique of socialism and central planning (and legislation), a
concept that assumed center stage throughout the whole of his work, featuring
prominently in his writings on spontaneous order.24 Many argue that the failure
of the socialist project with its reliance on central planning was an illustration
of informational complexity on a catastrophic level. 25 Systems theory,
particularly Niklas Luhmann's autopoietic theory of law, reaches similar
conclusions regarding system complexity and the limitations of centralized
design. 2 6 There is an implicit danger in tinkering with systems that we do not
fully understand. Lon L. Fuller's famous concept of polycentricity delivers a
similar verdict on the constraints of system complexity. Fuller famously
describes the difficulty of tinkering with interlocking complex networks with
the image of pulling on a spider's web: picking at one strand will invariably
produce unanticipated tensions throughout all the other strands of the web.27
Indeed, this can be thought of as something akin to tinkering with the weather.
Indeed, the problem of informational complexity has been noted with
regards to a sweeping range of order, from centrally-planned economies to
ecological as well as complex biological systems. Law is not exempt. Indeed,
informational complexity is a big problem for legislation. The unending
difficulty in applying statute to real-world situations is stark testament to this
challenge. These difficulties, it is argued here, stem directly from the problem
of informational complexity on a wide scale. 28 When crafting law, it is simply

23

See

HAYEK, THE ROAD

To

SERFDOM,

supra note 21, at 95. Hayek calls the idea that all the

relevant facts can be known to one mind a "synoptic delusion." See HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY, supra note 21, at 14. He terms this form of thinking "constructivist rationalism."
Id. at 5; see also ERIC ANGNER, HAYEK AND NATURAL LAW 51 (2007) (explaining, in very clear
terms, Hayek's thinking in this respect).
24
Hayek borrows the phrase from Michael Polanyi, explaining that: "Such an order...
cannot be established by central direction .... It is what M. Polanyi has called the spontaneous
formation of a 'polycentric order': 'When order is achieved among human beings by allowing
them to interact with each other on their own initiative ... we have a system of spontaneous
order in society."' HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 4, at 160.
25
See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 417, 418 (1993)
(reviewing ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991)).
26
Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaia, From Hayek's Spontaneous Orders to Luhmann's
Autopoietic Systems, 3 STUD. IN EMERGENT ORD. 50, 52-53 (2010), available at docs.sieo.org/
SIEO-3-20 10_Vilaca.pdf.
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 394
27
(1978); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) (arguing

insightfully that legal complexity generates excessive costs that may be mitigated through a
process of rule-simplification).
28 Hayek stresses that this weakness is implicit in statute. See Aeon J. Skoble, Hayek the
Philosopherof Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HAYEK 171, 176-77 (Edward Fescr ed.,

2006).
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impossible to anticipate all the consequences that will flow from its application.
This is arguably the fundamental shortcoming to deliberate design writ largeat best, lawmakers can make only educated guesses based on the limited
information they have available, but as the information is limited, their
understanding is limited. Lawmakers lack the requisite knowledge of all
relevant concrete circumstances. The process of legislation is thus extremely
prone to producing design errors. It is a project bound to periodically fail.
While our focus here is primarily upon statute, case law is also straightjacketed
by similar constraints. Notwithstanding the largely organic nature of stare
decisis, case law also suffers (albeit to a lesser degree) from the inherent
limitations of imposed social order caused by informational complexity. This is
clearly evidenced by the tangle of conceptual knots so often created by judgemade law. While the incremental nature of case law makes it arguably less
susceptible to the problem of informational complexity, it cannot match the
design efficiency of most customary social order, and as such, also often
produces very bad law. 29 It is because of this that the law, particularly the
common law, is locked within a constant state of modification and rectification
as design errors continually come to light. Judge-made law that results from
precedent is just imposed social order on a more localized level as compared
with statute and so, while superior to statute in this respect, to a great extent its
negative effects, because they are less far-reaching, are just less obvious. It
does not mean they are not present.
We see the problem of informational complexity with systems of
organization at all levels. Notwithstanding our good intentions, attempts at
improving a system's design by tinkering with the mechanics of natural
ordering frequently end in us just making a mess of things. Indeed, it is as the
sociologist Robert K. Merton famously put it, the irresolvable dilemma of
unintended consequences.30 As such, it seems wise, to the extent that it is
viable, to trust the natural process of social ordering and not rush to interfere
unless it is the case that there are clear and compelling reasons to do so. The
more the state seeks to regulate social order the wider the door is swung open
to the potential of creating bad law. As such, the hand of law should only
extend itself where the benefits of doing so are assured. This is particularly true
when dealing with highly complex systems where the impact of one's actions is
difficult to anticipate. Economic hyper-lexis is perhaps the most familiar
illustration of this. The problem of informational complexity, many right29

Hayek places (I feel unwarranted) faith in the ability of the common law to overcome the

problem of informational complexity. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY 69 (2004). As many commentators point out, Hayek seems to conflate
customary law and case law in his analysis. See Skoble, supra note 28, at 175 (referencing John
Hasnas' critique of Hayek in this respect). In any case, as a solution to the complexity problem,
customary social order far exceeds the incremental decision-making process of the common law.
30
Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM.
Soc. REv. 894, 898 (1936).
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leaning economists argue, 3' fundamentally precludes the possibility of
successful central market planning (this is discussed at greater length in the
section that follows). Indeed, some scholars frame this problem precisely in the
economic terms of legal centralism versus legal decentralism. Lawmaking is

conceptualized like commodity production: it can be either centralized or
decentralized.32 Robert D. Cooter, for example, argues that the information and

incentive constraints upon government officials demand that modem society

strive to incorporate decentralized forms of lawmaking.33 Statute can be
understood as the epitome of centralized lawmaking, case law less so; yet
customary law is the purest form of decentralized legal order, as a central rule-

making authority is entirely absent. Customary social order solves the problem
of information complexity because it is not the product of any central design: it
arises bottom-up in a purely organic fashion. As a result, customary social
order is less susceptible to design error, much like other natural ordering

systems that survive the winnowing effect of an evolutionary-like process
(organisms, plants, cells, ecological systems). Its survival as a customary
system34is a strong indication that it does not suffer from significant design
errors.

C. The Minimalist Approach to Economic Regulation

This is perhaps most visible in the context of economic regulation.
Regulatory minimalism in the economic realm can be understood as a subset of
the larger project of legislative minimalism. Many systems of customary social
order do not imply a market dynamic. Yet, that said, a great deal of social order
is subsumed by market forces. At its core, the market is a colossal system of
customary social order. 35 As such, it is not surprising that the question of where

31

I am referring here primarily to the scholars from the Austrian school of economics. For a

good general overview of the Austrian school, see

JESOs HUERTA DE SOTO, THE AusTRIAN

SCHOOL: MARKET ORDER AND ENTREPRENEURIAL CREATIVITY (2008).
32
See Cooter, supra note 25.

See, e.g., id.; see also Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 947, 948 (1997) ("[T]he urgency of bottom-up law increases with economic and social
complexity. As society diversifies and businesses specialize, state officials struggle to keep
informed about the changing practices of people, and people struggle to make lawmakers respond
to changing practices. To loosen these constraints on information and motivation, law must
decentralize.").
34
Yet it should be noted that evolutionary processes do not guarantee design perfections.
Such systems are not exempt from inefficiencies; they just stand a better chance of avoiding
them. As such, some sobriety is needed in dealing with the concept of minimalism. As well, this
process is completely silent as to the system's normative character. Indeed, the customary social
order may result in systems of order that are grossly "unjust" from a normative perspective.
35
Or a multiplicity of systems depending upon how one wishes to conceptualize the market.
33
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the line for regulatory intrusion should be drawn has engendered so much
persistent debate.
Modem calls for deregulation echo the "light-touch" minimalist
approach to regulation rooted in the laissez-faire ideology of the 19th century.
Cries to roll back state "interference" in the market grew particularly
vociferous in the latter half of the 20th century as the intellectual groundwork
of the Austrian school of economics took root. Beginning in the 1970s, many
economists in the West sounded the call to shrink the size of economic
regulation, arguing the virtues of keeping state intervention of economic and
social activities to a skeletal minimum.36 This provided the intellectual
momentum for reformist politicians in Europe and North America (most
notably Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) to dismantle economic
regulations throughout the 1980s. Salient examples of this "light-touch"
approach could be found in the regulation of international financial markets.
Issuance of bonds, derivatives, syndicated loans, hedge funds, and so on,
traditionally had no place for domestic or international regulation. The theme
was private ordering and, at most, private enforcement of formal, non-statebacked norms.37 Referencing the ideas of Hayek, Lawrence H. Summers,
former Secretary of the U.S. Treasury and former Chief Economist of the
World Bank, captured this understanding, asserting that "the invisible hand is
more powerful than the [un]hidden hand. Things will happen in well-organized
efforts without direction, controls, 3 8plans. That's the consensus among
economists. That's the Hayek legacy."
However, the financial crisis of 2007 exposed the limitations of this
customs-based system, underscoring the inherent danger in taking minimalism
to an inappropriate extreme. In the aftermath of the financial crisis,
deregulation has been widely condemned as a failure. Yet it would be a
colossal mistake-indeed, it would be intellectual negligence-to simply
dismiss the point that these theorists make regarding the dangers of tinkering
with complex systems of order. It is a powerful argument, and it finds strong
support in many examples well beyond the economic realm. As with most
things, the answer likely lies somewhere in the middle. While we can indeed
scale back the legislative intrusiveness of the state, we must be careful to not
allow this to devolve into an anarchic free-for-all. Different dynamics will
allow for different degrees of minimalism. And so it is the case for legislative
minimalism writ large. Within the biological realm, this is precisely what the

36
37

See Cooter, supra note 25.
For the concept of self-regulation, see Anthony Ogus, Self-Regulation, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 587, 587-602 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000),

available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9400book.pdf;

Anthony

Ogus,

Rethinking Self-

Regulation, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 97, 97-108 (1995).
38

DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN

GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 150-51 (1998).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 117

practice of medicine does: it modulates the natural processes of the human
body. Agriculture alters the natural patterning of ecological systems yet has
changed the course of human history for the better. Indeed, most economists
advocate for a mixed economy where a decentralized market is gently guided
by an element of central planning. 39 No doubt the same paradigm may be
usefully applied to law. We should opt for a more nuanced approach that
recognizes that various gradations of state intrusion are possible.
D. The Liability of Ideology-Both Left and Right
As such, when appraising the value of minimalism, it is best to put
political ideology aside. Unfortunately, this has not usually been the case, and it
has led to some very ugly results. On one side, the conversation at times seems
hijacked by interest groups that stand to benefit financially from scaling back
the scope of regulation within the private sector. For these "partisans" of
smaller government, minimalism is a philosophy of mere convenience. Yet in
the other camp we have the strident disciples of the state, offering only civility
and blind subservience to the rent-seeking, fumbling, and often pernicious force
of centralized power. In the academy, the argument against minimalism seems
to be winning the day: those who advocate for a minimalist approach have not
received the attention due them in academic discourse. 40 Yet there remains
legitimate intellectual footing here. It would be academically reckless to not
recognize the legitimacy of the minimalist position. An honest tallying informs
us, as is so often the case, that both sides to the dispute merit serious
intellectual attention. Rather than interminably debating the advantages of
decentralized versus centralized planning, we ought to be discussing the correct
mix of the two. 41 It is important to maintain an even-handed perspective: the
implicit liabilities of over-regulation should not be denied, nor should we adopt
a position that blindly discounts the important role of the state in sustaining and
optimizing social order. The advantage of legislative minimalism is that its
stratified character allows for a more realistic balance between the extremes of
legislative maximalism on the one hand and the complete absence of formal
law on the other. As a policy approach, it thus occupies the sober middle
ground between these two poles.
Yet it is very difficult to escape ideology. The general tenor of nonintrusiveness that legislative minimalism brings to the table has clear political
resonance. It not only reduces the potential to mess things up through

39

See STEPHEN D. TANSEY, BUSINESS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 79 (2003).

40

MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 2

(2006).
41
See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:Rediscovering
Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1295, 1298 (1998) (making a similar point
regarding private ordering in the context of online commerce).
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legislative over-intrusiveness (the technical argument), it arguably fosters a
freer society that is more in tune with the basic tenets of a modem liberal,
pluralistic state (the normative argument). Neo-classical liberal theorists sound
this theme loudly, arguing that minimalism is more compatible with liberal
principles.4 2 The contention is that in order to allow the exercise of individual
freedom, the ambit of state power should be constrained as much as possible. In
that customary order is merely a reflection of established norms, the argument
goes, such bottom-up order does not coerce in the same oppressive sense as
legislated law.43 While this argument may be legitimate, unfortunately,
ideological incantations of this nature too often inspire an all-or-nothing
approach that precludes nuance and obliterates any hope of pragmatic
flexibility. Too often, those who advocate slaughtering the state on the altar of
individual liberty go too far. This is particularly true for anarchists (of whatever
stripe) who call for the complete dismantling of the state.
There is a great deal of intellectual polarization. We must be vigilant
against the ideological extremes persistent in our culture, extremes that too
often hew fanatically towards a kind of myopic absolutism. Let us avoid being
swept away in the surging currents of ideology. Let us approach the question
with the view that the problem is not so much paternalism, an encroachment
upon personal liberty, or an invisible hand clenched in indifference, but rather
that the problem is simply design error. As such, it is better if we divorce the
conversation from ideology. Customary social order, if harnessed correctlythat is in a non-ideological and pragmatic fashion-could prove immensely
beneficial. 4 To do this, however, policymakers need to know clearly when it is
necessary to extend the reach of regulation and to what degree. For this, a
sturdy intellectual scaffolding is required. Constructing such a framework is the
goal of the rest of this paper.
III.
ARTICULATING A FRAMEWORK FOR LEGISLATIVE MINIMALISM
H.L.A. Hart once observed that "[c]ustoms arise, whereas laws are
made.
From this he concluded it is therefore impossible for custom to ever
serve the ends of policymakers.4 6 What Hart failed to appreciate, however, is
45

42

Hayek in particular makes a strong case along these lines. See generally,

HAYEK, LAW,

LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 21; see also F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE

ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (W. W. Bartley III ed., 1991).
43 See Skoble, supra note 28, at 176-78.
44 I have written elsewhere on the possibly of harnessing the energy of customary law in a
strategic fashion. See Druzin, supra note 6.
45 Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLawfor a Complex Economy: The StructuralApproach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PENN. L. REv. 1643, 1655 (1996) (citing H. L. A.
HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961)).
46

See H. L. A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961).
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that simply allowing customary social order to arise unimpeded is itself an
important policy end. Legislative minimalism, in that it articulates a structured
methodology, enables lawmakers to more effectively achieve this. To construct
such a methodological framework, however, we must first undertake a
reconceptualization of sorts. We should understand legislative minimalism and
legislative maximalism not as opposite approaches but rather two extreme ends
of a single continuum (see fig. 1 below).
Figure 1. The figure below depicts various forms of legislative minimalism along a continuum of
intervention between legislative minimalism and legislative maximalism. These different forms
of legislative minimalism are outlined below.

Legislative minimalism

Noninterference

Legislative maximalism

Formalizing

Fine-tuning

Dismantling

Concocting

While a policy of pure legislative minimalism is often simply not
feasible, unrestrained legislative maximalism can, as we have said, generate
very bad law due to the natural constraints imposed by informational
complexity. Fortunately, it is not all or nothing: there are gradations of
legislative intrusion that may be employed. The state can deal with customary
social order in a number of ways, choosing from a variety of strategies. Below,
I detail five strategies. Most of these strategies themselves allow for different
degrees of intensity, i.e. thinner and thicker forms-they are in a sense
themselves mini-continuums. 47 The degree to which the state can pursue a
legislative minimalist approach will depend simply upon the nature of the
particular patterns that have emerged. What is required is to first identify if
there is a discernible pre-existing pattern of customary social order. If there is,
we then need to determine what kind of customary system we are dealing with
and apply the legislative minimalist policy that keeps intrusion to a workable
minimum while correcting, sustaining, or perhaps strengthening that system,
whatever the case may be.
Where customary social order has emerged, lawmakers can do one of
five things depending upon the nature of that order: (1) do nothing if the system
of rules is functional and adequately efficient; (2) simply formalize the system
as is, giving it some enforcement teeth to further bolster its efficacy; (3) tweak
47
The strategy of Non-interference does not by its structural nature admit to thin and thick
forms. Note that I use the terms light and heavy to describe the continuum of intervention as a
whole and the strategies that fall along it. Light strategies are those in the direction of legislative
minimalism and heavy strategies are those in the direction of legislative maximalism.
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it where necessary if there are inefficiencies; (4) override and dismantle it
where it is grossly inefficient (as indeed it may very well be); or (5) fabricate a
completely new system of order from scratch.4 8 From a legislative minimalist
perspective, the first and second of these options are clearly the best, and the
third remains preferable to the fourth, which should only be invoked as a
measure of very last resort. The fifth option is clearly the least desirable, as it is
highly prone to design error due to the natural constraints of informational
complexity. These five approaches are the only ones available to the
policymaker. Yet no one has yet articulated this taxonomy, naming, cataloging,
and distinguishing clearly between these, the only possible options. This
taxonomy recognizes a range of regulatory strategies that stand between the
poles of imposed and spontaneous order. On one side we have legislative
maximalism, blundering and highly fallible; on the other we have extreme
legislative minimalism with its overly-optimistic faith in the efficiency of
natural ordering. This paper carves out a vast middle space between these two
extremes. Which strategy is most optimal will depend on the particular
characteristics of the customary system.
A. Non-Interference
The first of these five strategies may seem the most radical, but it is, in
fact, just the opposite. If the existing rules are determined to already be optimal
(or simply sufficiently functional), the state can simply let the system of order
function completely free of state intrusion. For ease of reference, we can term
this approach Non-interference. In fact, Non-interference is what the law does
most of the time: the state does not seek to regulate the vast majority of social
ordering. It actually stays well clear of most of it, electing to regulate only a
small sliver of existing social order. There exists a vast sea of social rules
completely untouched by formal law. These systems of customary social order
function all without any need for codification or enforcement. Indeed, the need
to formulate and enforce order can be understood as a sign of this natural
process failing.4 9 Moreover, formal enforcement is often not even viable.
Consider for a moment the impracticality of the state having to enforce
something as simple as the rules of queuing or the rules of English grammar.
Fortunately, the state does not enforce such regulatory standards nor, more
importantly, does it need to. There is no need for the state to regulate queuing.

48
Hybrids of these strategies are also possible. This idea of hybrid strategies is examined
later in the discussion. See infra Part IVA.
49
Lon Fuller makes this point nicely, stating that, in its ideal form legal order "works so
smoothly that there is never any occasion to resort to force or the threat of force to effectuate its
norms." LON L. FULLER, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 221 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981); see also Cooter, supra

note 33, at 955-57 (discussing how the law affects internalization of social obligations).
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It is a reasonably efficient system of social ordering that is mostly selfenforcing. Ticket queuing may be more advantageous (though not necessarily
in all situations); however, lining up is sufficiently efficient.
Even where slightly inefficient, interference still may not be worth the
cost (cost need not be measured purely in monetary terms). For instance, while
customary rules that allow for pushing instead of orderly queuing may be less
efficient, this may still not justify interference. The demands involved in
regulation may simply be too high. Indeed, the enforcement burden of
legislating queuing regulations across society would simply be untenable.50 The
administrative cost of interfering with low-level systems of customary rules (in51
this case pushing) must be weighed, employing a cost-effectiveness analysis.
Many systems of customary social order, while imperfect, may not be worth the
cost of regulating, making Non-interference for this reason alone a preferable
approach.
Of the five options, Non-interference is the most ideal. So long as it is
feasible, law should strive to be less intrusive, wherever possible allowing
order to function unhindered instead of trying to impose it from above. If the
system is functional and does not suffer from gross inefficiencies then a policy
of Non-interference is preferable. It is the "safest" approach. This "light" form
of intervention is the path endorsed by anarchists and to a large extent by those
in the libertarian camp. The state should not interfere: "the best form of
government is a government that governs least" (in the case of anarchists, this
would be a government that does not exist). 52 Non-interference is the most
extreme form of legislative minimalism. While it is at times feasible and indeed
a skillful approach to governance it is quite often simply not a viable option.
Formal law has its role to play.

50
Although it is not inconceivable and is in fact often performed on the local level. The case
of queuing norms in McDonald's in Hong Kong provides a good example. When McDonald's
first opened in Hong Kong in 1975, patrons "clumped around the cash registers, shouting orders
and waving money over the heads of people in front of them. The company responded by
James L. Watson, Globalization in Asia: Anthropological
introducing queue monitors ....
Perspectives, in GLOBALIZATION: CULTURE AND EDUCATION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 156
(Marcelo M. Sudrez-Orozco & Desir6e Baolian Qin-Hilliard eds., 2004). A customary system of
queuing quickly replaced a customary system based upon pushing in McDonald's restaurants. Id.
51 Note that I call for a cost-effectiveness analysis rather than a cost-benefit analysis. This is

because assigning monetary value to outcomes would limit our discussion to a specific normative
format (economic) at the expense of a more expansive evaluative standard.
52
While this quote (I am paraphrasing) is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson or Thomas
Paine, the true source seems to be Henry David Thoreau. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Civil
Disobedience, in ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: AMERICAN ESSAYS, OLD AND NEW 11 (1969).
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B. Formalizing

Also a preferable approach for the same reason is our second option:
the state can directly take up these spontaneously-formed rules and formalize
them. Architects may have a lot to teach lawmakers here. Architects sometimes
design large building complexes but wait to fill in the pathways until after
observing the natural flow of pedestrian traffic. These informal pedestrian
routes are then later paved over as formal walking paths where the pathways
have become worn in.53 This is a good metaphor for how law can use
customary social order. In the same way, where there is sufficient foot traffic
(i.e. customary social order), the state may assume the strategy of an architect
awaiting the actors to fill in the pathways of legal structure. We can call this
form of legislative minimalism Formalizingbecause it simply grants a formal
status to an informal pattern of order. While Non-interference is ideal,
Formalizing is often necessary due to free-riding, among other reasons.5 4 The
efficiency of customary patterning may be undermined by enforcement
problems. This is especially true where an increase in group size sabotages the
natural enforcement mechanisms of small-group social order.55 This is an old
justification for state intervention in social ordering. Indeed, the notion that
maintenance of social order through enforcement is a public good goes all the
way back to Hobbes.5 6
While a stable, relatively efficient system of customary social order
may emerge, persistent cheating along its edges makes Formalizing a relatively
non-intrusive,57 yet very effective, option for the state. The strategy of
Formalizing is, in fact, extremely common. So much so, in fact, that it mostly
goes unnoticed. The law largely conforms to existing norms, and these
customary rules are given enforcement teeth to preempt the possibility of
skewed incentive structures and ensure compliance. This can be done through
the threat of criminal sanctions, the threat of fines, or the granting of a right to
civil action. Formalizing is simply taking an existing system of order and
53

The concept of this kind of emergence has been linked to theories of urban complexity. See

generally BENJAMIN DOCKTER, URBAN COMPLEXITY: A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE DESIGN OF

CITIES (2010) (presenting research analyzing the modem design of cities).
54
Hayek indeed recognized this. Speaking on the need for enforcement, he remarked that
people "may have to be made to obey, since, although it would be in the interest of each to
disregard them, the overall order on which the success of their actions depends will arise only if
these rules are generally followed." HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 21, at

45.
55

For these mechanisms, see supra note 17.

56

See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A.P. Martinich & Brian Battiste eds., Broadview Press

2010) (1651) (arguing for the necessity of a strong undivided government); see also MICHAEL
TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION

1-2 (1987)

(noting that LEVIATHAN, supra,

represented the first full expression of this justification for the state).
57
That is, relatively non-intrusive in terms of artificially creating order.
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strengthening it through codification and formal enforcement. Yet, while
bolstering enforcement is a common motivation for Formalizing, an equal
motivation is the fact that existing customary social order already enjoys
widespread compliance, rendering it far easier to codify. Overall, the approach
is a very attractive form of legislative minimalism because it simply formalizes
order rather than building order from scratch. As such, it sidesteps the problem
of informational complexity and design error. Yet it remains highly minimalist.
This has, for example, traditionally been the state's approach regarding much
of contract law and indeed continues to be an overarching principle. While
there are clear exceptions to this, the state's role in contract is radically minimal
compared with other areas of law. This brand of legislative minimalism forms
the core of the 19th century laissez-faire view of contract law.58 I examine the
role of minimalism in contract law in Part IV.
It is important to recognize that Formalizing is extraordinarily
common. Indeed, the codification of much of the civil law from the tradition of
medieval "customaries"-collections of local customary law that were
gradually codified by local jurists,5 9 of which, the Coutume de Paris is perhaps
the most well-known example 6 -represents Formalizing on a truly massive
scale. Perhaps the most obvious examples are found in colonial and postcolonial systems where pre-existing indigenous customary social order is
incorporated into the legal system. 61 More generally, the legal importance of
customary social order comes to the fore probably most notably in the case of
international law where a coherent legal order is gradually gliding into being.
In the realm of international law, "custom stands next to treaties as a primary

The distinguished American legal scholar Roscoe Pound once described this approach
stating that "the law was conceived negatively as a system of hands off while [people] do things
rather than as a system of ordering to prevent friction and waste." LINDA MULCAHY & JOHN
TILLOTSON, CONTRACT LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 34 (4th ed. 2004). The laissez-faire belief as
encapsulated in freedom of contract, however, has been dramatically curtailed since the 19th
century. See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) (illustrating
how, grounded upon basic notions of fairness, the growth of consumer protection and
employment legislation has limited freedom of contract). I revisit this later in the paper. See infra
Part IV.B. This minimalist view is of course especially prevalent among those of a libertarian
persuasion. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 16, at 26 (setting forth the classical libertarian view of
the minimalist state).
59 For a good overview of the absorption of customary law into the civil law, see JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 20-26 (3d ed. 2007).
I refer the interested reader to JEAN TRONCON, COUTUME DE LA VILLE ET PREVOTt (1618).
60
Similarly, see the use of medieval English "custumals," textual compilations of the local social
customs of a manor or town. See BRITISH BOROUGH CHARTERS 1042-1216, at xvii (Adolphus
Ballard ed., 2010).
61 For example, the South African Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998 recognized
customary marriages, preserving its legality. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of
1998 (S.Afr.).
58
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source of law."62 The fact that custom is paid so much overt deference in the
field of international law may be attributed to the absence of a central
legislative authority-there are really few alternatives.
In case the prevalence of Formalizing is not immediately obvious, let
me provide some more examples. Indeed, history is replete with lessons in
Formalizing. I will present examples drawn from disparate quarters of law to
support my argument (something I do throughout the paper). A great
illustration of Formalizing is the case of the medieval law merchant, the lex
mercatoria, which gave rise to a complex system of order, i.e. business
customs, which national laws to a great extent later co-opted and codified.
Indeed, the most basic principles of contract such as formation, content,
misrepresentation, mistake, and duress, as well as the incorporation of notes
and bills or exchanges, arose originally not through the complex mechanics of
legislation, but from the customary rules of merchants, only to be later co-opted
by nation states and codified.63 The historical rules governing international
shipping, the lex maritima, is another good illustration of Formalizing. The lex
maritima,developed transnationally over a number of centuries as an extension
of the law merchant. The lex maritima was a body of oral rules, customs, and
usages relating to navigation and maritime commerce arising in medieval
Western Europe from the 9th to the 12th centuries. 64 The lex maritima was
eventually absorbed into domestic laws through legislative processes. 65 The
66
effect of Formalization was a strengthening of this system of customary law.
The lex maritima survives today as the core constituents of much contemporary
maritime law, particularly the maritime law of the U.K., the United States, and
Canada.67

Another great example of Formalizing is the law of war, jus in bello.
The law of war is derived from a conglomerate of customary rules that
percolated up through the long and bloody history of armed conflict, finding

62
Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law: Customary Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 603, 603 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available

at http:// encyclo.findlaw.com/9500book.pdf.
63 See Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law,
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(1994),

available at

http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1050&context-robert-cooter
(speaking
about the absorption of merchant practices into the English common law); see also LEON E.
TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 23 (1983) (discussing

the co-opting of merchant practices into both the civil and common law systems).
64
William Tetley, The General Maritime Law-The Lex Maritima,20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
&CoM. 105, 109 (1994).
65 For a good overview of this process of formalizing, see id. at 110-12.
66
See id. at 110.
67
See id. at 144.
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formal codification only relatively recently. 68 The law of war is a fascinating
dynamic when one stops to really consider it: even within the fevered grip of
conflict, customary social order emerges to set codified parameters to
organized barbarism. That customary rules emerge between combatants in a
self-imposed fashion speaks to the unremitting power of customary social
order: even antagonists bent on mutual destruction, operating in the complete
absence of a central authority, nevertheless coalesce around a system of
customary rules to regulate their hostilities. Clearly, these are not parties
aiming to create a system of cooperative order. Nevertheless, robust customary
social order-the rules of war-arises (quite reliably in fact) upon the bloody
and chaotic landscape of conflict. 69 The international process of codification
70
began in earnest in the mid-19th century with the first Geneva Convention.
The Geneva Conventions and additional protocols are excellent examples of
Formalizing in that they largely codified pre-existing, widely adhered to
customary rules of war, i.e. international norms for humanitarian treatment in
war. 71 Likewise, the Hague Conventions codified many pre-existing norms of
military conduct. Indeed, the Hague Conventions are quite explicit that
Formalizing was one of its main goals: "to revise the laws and general customs
of war, either with the view of defining them more precisely or of laying down
72
certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as far as possible.

68

For an excellent, yet concise, overview of the history ofjus in bello, see

DAVID CAVALERI,

LAW OF WAR: CAN 20TH-CENTURY STANDARDS APPLY TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM? 31-

53 (2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/csi-cavaleri-law.pdf (Global
War on Terrorism Occassional Paper 9).
An extraordinary example of the power of customary social order, even between
69
adversaries, is that of soldiers on the Western Front in WWI. Truces were quite common between
Allied and German units that had been facing one another for long periods of time and fought
repeated internecine battles over the same territory. In these conditions, complex "systems of
communication developed to agree terms, apologize for accidental infractions and ensure relative
peace-all without the knowledge of the high commands on each side ....Raids and artillery
barrages were used to punish the other side for defection ..." MATr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF
VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 65 (1997).
Though it should be noted that the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime
70

Law, abolishing

privateering, came into force eight years earlier in 1856. Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime
Law, Apr. 16, 1856, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e
76c41256739003e636d/19ee25331 1lf9e2ec125641a004b25ba?OpenDocument.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law:
71
Overlaps, Gaps, and Ambiguities, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 493, 507 (M. Cherif

Bassiouni ed., 2008); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Development of InternationalHumanitarian
Law and the Continued Relevance of Custom, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: THE
JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 117, 118 (Howard M.

Hensel ed., 2013).
Hague Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
72
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble, July 29,
1899, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&
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The Lieber Code during the American Civil War (also known as Instructions
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order
No.100) is considered to be the first official codification of the laws and
customs of war. Yet, ultimately, the Lieber Code simply reflected the customs
of war prevailing at that time. 7 4 It did not create new rules-it simply
formalized existing ones.
History is littered with countless examples of customary social order
being absorbed and transformed into formal law. And this trend may be
observed today where it continues unabated in an international context. For
example, Formalizing is quite evident in modern codification efforts, such as
UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, CISG, the Lando-Principles, and the UCC, which
are but formal reflections of pre-existing commercial practices-the
Formalizing of existing systems of order.75 Commerce is a form of social
interaction so important that the state deems it necessary to bestow upon it
formal enforcement mechanisms to shore up existent systems of order. Yet, this
is not merely reserved for modern law of an international flavor. Indeed, at its
heart, modem criminal codes are (for the most part) massive projects of
Formalizing: the codification of highly normative social rules.
Formalizing allows for more reliable enforcement. In fact, having
arisen organically, customary systems are often already largely selfenforcing.7 6 Yet the actual enforcement component of Formalizing may, in fact,
documentld=9FE084CDAC63D10FC12563CD00515C4D. The first part to this excerpt
("defining them more precisely") speaks to my point. The remainder of the quote implies a
degree of Fine-tuning. I discuss Fine-tuning below.
73
MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE CIVIL WAR AND THE LIMITS OF DESTRUCTION 36 (2007).
74

Id.

See Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place, in THE
PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 12-14 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001); see also Bryan
Druzin, Law Without the State: The Theory of High Engagement and the Emergence of
Spontaneous Legal Order Within Commercial Systems, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 559, 561 (2010)
(positing a theory, high engagement theory, explaining the ability of commerce to generate and
sustain decentralized legal order).
75

76

See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES

(1994) (citing informal enforcement mechanisms amongst cattle ranchers in Shasta County,
California). This theme is also an old one in sociology. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (documenting the evolution of informal control mechanisms and attempts
by lawyers to undermine or appropriate them); Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The "Back
Forty" on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of FarmlandContracts,8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366 (1992) (discussing the use of simple farmland contracts in place of
complicated and expensive alternatives); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992)
(exploring a system of private governance that has developed in the diamond trade); Janet T.
Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An InstitutionalAlternative
to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 351 (1981) (developing a theory of the ethnically
homogenous middleman group "using a property rights-public choice approach and drawing on
the economics of signaling"); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
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not be as important as the mere act of Formalizing. This is something that is
easily missed. Codifying an existent system of rules is in itself socially useful
in that it clarifies the rules for participants already willing to comply but unable
77
to perfectly coordinate (a coordination game as it is called in game theory).
This is a largely unappreciated aspect to codification. Typically, the focus is
upon the enforcement advantages codification brings; however, Formalizing
serves a crucial function in simply providing clarity. The law of war may be a
good illustration of my point: actors may wish to abide by certain rules
(because it is in their mutual interests to do so), but so long as these norms are
not clearly acknowledged, a contestant in battle may hesitate. This is true for all
the actors and so compliance may falter. In these situations, concrete
enforcement mechanisms take a backseat to the simple act of codification. Just
making the rules clear can have a powerful impact in terms of compliance,
much like how the Oxford English Dictionary clarifies the English language for
speakers already eager to comply with whatever the lexiconic rules of the day
are. The Oxford English Dictionary does not create; it merely codifies. (In fact,
it often significantly lags behind the self-ordering process of the English
language.) It boasts no enforcement mechanisms yet nevertheless serves an
invaluable regulating function in codifying a pre-existing system of
spontaneous linguistic order.78 An example of the above point is law formally
recognizing left or right-hand drive (a coordination game). The simple act of
codification (and thus clarification) of the rule is enough to generate
compliance, as all drivers (for obvious reasons) are eager to comply with
whatever the rule is. 79 Indeed, driving on a particular side of the road rarely
needs to actually be enforced; it simply needs to be declared.

Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 719 (1973) ("argu[ing]
that an inspection of semi-autonomous social fields strongly suggests that the various processes
that make internally generated ruled effective are also often the immediate forces that dictate the
mode of compliance or noncompliance to state-made legal rules").
77
For a fascinating treatment of this idea, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) (using game theoretic terms to explain how systems
of order can emerge from law, merely creating focal points without the need for actual
enforcement). McAdams's approach borrows conceptually from the work of Thomas Schelling
on focal points. For the idea of focal points and salience, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-58 (1960).
78
Similarly, the treaties and conventions that enshrine the law of war do not boast genuine
enforcement mechanisms. It is that such rules will be reciprocated that gives such codification
efficacy. They are largely "self-enforcing agreement[s]," i.e. treaties where "[r]eciprocity and
reputation are the key enforcement mechanisms." Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and
Violation, 13 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 273, 275 (2010), availableat http://www.annualreviews.org/
doi/pdf/10.1 146/annurev.polisci. 12.040907.132713.
79
McAdams actually goes on to demonstrate how this may also hold true in games other than
games of pure coordination. See McAdams, supra note 77.
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C. Fine-Tuning
The third option is less ideal, as it involves a degree of regulatory
intrusion, yet it is often required. Here the state tweaks the emergent pattern on
a structural level, targeting particular design errors while allowing the bulk of
the system to function mostly unimpeded by regulation. We can refer to this
form of legislative minimalism as Fine-tuning. This is necessary in some
situations because there is no guarantee that grown order does not suffer from
inefficiencies. Fine-tuning is appropriate where a small structural change can
notably increase the system's efficiency. Fine-tuning represents a significant
step along the continuum of legislative minimalism, as it is a substantial jump
in the level of intrusion. While Formalizing does not seek to alter the social
patterning, seeking instead to merely reinforce and strengthen it, 80 Fine-tuning,
in contrast, attempts to remedy system inefficiencies stemming from design
error. These inefficiencies may be the result of exogenous changes in the
environment, rendering previously efficient systems inefficient, or it may
simply be that despite its organic emergence, the system was never entirely
efficient (yet was sufficiently efficient to sustain itself). As game theory
suggests, bottom-up social patterning may give rise to multiple equilibria;
however, these may be quite sub-optimal.8 1
A good example is the driving norms of many third-world cities. For
the most part, these systems of order arise bottom-up. While ostensibly chaotic,
this traffic order is functional. The traffic moves. Yet these roads suffer from
severe yet preventable traffic congestion. Faced with these traffic patterns,
governments often institute policies of Fine-tuning. Driving rules are fine-tuned
in certain respects in order to increase the efficient flow of traffic, while the
majority of these bottom-up "rules of the road" are de facto left in place
through lax enforcement. The system of order is largely functional, yet it can
benefit enormously in terms of efficiency with just a little strategic Fine-tuning:
traffic lights at key intersections, etc. Even in the highly-regulated roads of
developed cities, a tremendous amount of traffic patterning is left up to natural
ordering. Indeed, the vast majority of it. This is not immediately obvious but
becomes clear upon reflection. Take, for example, the case of speeding. In
theory, regulators could prescribe a precise driving speed for every inch of the
road predetermined as optimal to minimize accidents. However, this would be
extraordinarily difficult to determine (and enforce) and indeed debilitatingly

80

Yet this may not be so simple: because Formalizing will change the dispute resolutions

available, it may therefore, in fact, change the ex ante patterning. This will likely be the case
even if it is simply an expectation that the customary patterning will eventually be formalized.
81
I am referring here to what is known in game theory as the folk theorem. See Drew
Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with
Incomplete Information, 54 ECONOMETRICA 533 (1986), available at http://www.eecs.
harvard.edu/-'parkes/cs286r/spring06/papers/fudmaskin-folk86.pdf.
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complex when one factors in the ceaselessly shifting traffic conditions.
However, what regulators do is set an upper and lower limit to speeding. Speed
patterns are then left to naturally self-organize within this prescribed range. In
the case of the strategy of Fine-tuning, the customary social order is not left to
freely self-pattem nor is it targeted for elimination-it is simply redirected and
tweaked along the margins. The total elimination of customary social ordering
is the goal of the fourth strategy, to which we now turn.
D. Dismantling
The fourth option we can term Dismantling.I call it this because it is
the complete dismantling of a pre-existing system of order. There may be
several reasons for the state to engage in Dismantling. There is no guarantee
that bottom-up ordering will be efficient. Indeed, from a societal perspective, it
may be profoundly sub-optimal. Situations such as these may be understood as
a form of market failure in the marketplace for customary social order.
Alternatively, the system of customary social order may be highly efficient yet
be so fundamentally contrary to public policy that Dismantling is necessary. In
either case, however, Dismantling should be used only as a measure of last
resort and, as a general policy, avoided wherever possible. This is because it is
not only highly vulnerable to design error, it may also often require
considerable resources to implement, as it is, in essence, the state battling
against a pre-existing system of social order. The 18th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and the disastrous project of Prohibition in the early 20th century
is a good example of how difficult Dismantling may be. Not only were the
economic costs of Prohibition extraordinarily high, legislatively meddling with
a highly complex system such as patterns of alcohol consumption had serious,
unpredicted consequences: it unhealthily distorted drinking habits
(consumption of hard-liquor actually increased in many places), 82 increased
deaths related to alcohol poisoning (due to the substandard quality of blackmarket alcohol), 83 and birthed vast organized crime networks related to the
illegal production and distribution of alcohol.84 These were all unanticipated
negative externalities. In fact, prohibition is an excellent example of the
problem of informational complexity and the dangers of imposed social order.
Dismantling as a matter of policy, however, is often necessary. For
example, a self-ordering normative system that institutionalized racial
discrimination, having evolved due to an imbalanced power structure, would
82

Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, Alcohol Prohibition and Drug Prohibition:Lessons

from Alcohol Policyfor Drug Policy, in DRUGS AND SOCIETY: U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 48 (Jefferson
M. Fish ed., 2006).
83 SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, PROHIBITION: THE LIE OF THE LAND 255-56 (1981).
84

MITCHEL P. ROTH, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

230 (2010).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/5

26

Druzin: Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to Shrink the

RESTRAINING THE HAND OFLAW

2014]

cry out to be remedied through top-down law. 85 The outlawing of slavery under
the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a highly complex system
that had existed for well over 200 years, and later desegregation through the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are good examples of such systems of customary
order. The ancient Hindu caste system of India was a robust customary system
of social stratification that existed for millennia yet was systematically
dismantled through legal and social initiatives. The Indian Constitution enacted
in 1950 with its explicit prohibition on caste discrimination (Article 15) was
aimed at the complete dismantling of the caste system. 86 Customary social
order may be highly efficient, robust, and internalized but nevertheless grossly
unjust. Thus, the state may need to dismantle such order. Vast, decentralized
drug-trafficking networks are highly efficient self-ordering systems; 87 however,
this alone does not justify their continued existence. In some situations,
efficiency should be sacrificed for issues of justice. However, by the same
token, sometimes justice may itself be a matter of efficiency. 88 When exactly to
dismantle systems of customary social order is an extremely thorny question.
When the law is taken as a whole, however, Dismantling is actually not as
common as one would think. Indeed, law mostly engages in the first three
options (Non-interference, Formalizing, and Fine-tuning), harnessing the
energy of pre-existing customary social order rather than opposing it.
E.

Concocting

Sometimes arising in the aftermath of Dismantling, but also emerging
in isolation, is what we may call Concocting. This is where the state simply
creates legal order from scratch where there was no pre-existing system of
customary order. It artificially constructs order. Examples of this form of
legislating include the creation of a tax code, the patent system, and other such
synthetic artifices concocted by the state.89 These are quintessential expressions
of legislative maximalism. Because it does not build on any pre-existing natural
85

Such normative evaluations, however, vary by society and time-period.

86

BRIJ KISHORE SHARMA, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 76 (4th
ed. 2007).

See Jana S. Benson & Scott H. Decker, The OrganizationalStructure of InternationalDrug
Smuggling, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 130 (2010) (showing that such networks often display a "general
lack of formal structure" and are "composed of isolated work groups without formal
connections").
88
Certainly, scholars of a normative law and economics persuasion would agree, particularly
in regards to allocative efficiency.
89
Yet even our modem tax codes are, at their core, extensions of archaic systems of rentseeking that no doubt predate the emergence of the state or are decentralized systems of taxation
that coincided with the existence of the state, such as tax farming systems. See HIRONOIU
ASAKURA, WORLD HISTORY OF THE CUSTOMS AND TARIFFS 199-207 (2003) (presenting a
historical overview of the end of tax farming in England). Certainly, even complex taxation
systems owe their origins to spontaneous ordering patterns of some kind.
87
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order, legal creation of this kind is highly prone to design error. It is a purely
artificial creation. And herein lies the fundamental problem with top-down
legal order: it does not, as this paper advocates, strategically utilize pre-existing
customary social order. From the perspective of design-efficiency, Concocting
is often really the very worst form of legal order. When it is fairly large in
scope, it often just creates a bloated, complicated mess of inefficient rules-a
tangled skein of disjointed regulation.
Yet Concocting too is sometimes necessary. Fortunately, of the five
strategies, it is actually the least employed. 90 For the most part, imposed legal
order builds upon and incorporates patterns of customary social order. We see
this rather clearly with the strategies of Formalizing and Fine-tuning. Together
with Non-interference, they are the most common techniques of governance.
Dismantling and Concocting are comparatively rare. Legal maximalism is
atypical, and indeed, complete legal maximalism does not really exist. The vast
bulk of social order remains unregulated: sleeping patterns, copulation patterns,
etc. Indeed, complete legal maximalism would not only most likely be
abhorrent in a normative sense; it is, in fact, a logistic impossibility. There is
not, nor has there ever been, a society marked by total legal maximalism.
IV. CLARIFYING THE FRAMEWORK

A. A Tabulated Comparison of the Strategies
While these five strategies represent different points along a single
continuum of interventionism, they are ontologically distinct. However, this
may not always be readily apparent. In some respects the strategies bleed into
one another. For example, in some cases, Fine-tuning may appear to
demonstrate elements of Dismantling. In other cases, Dismantling may be
conceptualized as a form of Fine-tuning, and so on and so forth. 9' There may
even be hybrid strategies that combine strategies. Yet while there can be a
degree of overlap, on a fundamental level the strategies are distinct from one

90

Concocting is actually not very common. Indeed, the "rules of law rarely create new forms

of human activity; instead, they tend to regulate and modify on-going customary human
enterprises." See James Bernard Murphy, Habit and Convention at the Foundation of Custom, in
THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 53,

68-69 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James B. Murphy eds., 2007).
91
Part of this problem stems from the difficulty in defining a system. Systems often overlap,
interconnect, and subsume one another in highly complex ways, making them difficult to clearly
identify. For example, is pedestrianizing a downtown area of a city an example of Dismantling or
Fine-tuning? If the system here is defined as traffic in the downtown area then it is Dismantling;
if the system is defined as the traffic patterns of the entire city, or country, then it is an example
of Fine-tuning. The problem is that what is a "system" largely depends on how we choose to
define it. This question opens a conceptual can of worms regarding the definition of a system that
spans across the disciplines. Articulating such a definition is the cornerstone of systems theory.
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another. To sharpen this point, I provide below a tabulated comparison of the
five strategies. The first line of the table contrasts the strategies'
methodologies. The second line clarifies how commonly the strategies are
employed. The third line uses the example of traffic regulation to give concrete
form to the concepts.
Table 1. A tabulated comparison of the five strategies of legislative minimalism.

Non-interference Formalizing Fine-tuning Dismantling Concocting

Methodology

Allow the
system of
order to
function
completely
unhindered

Grant formal
status to the
system of
order
(usually with
sanctions)

Tweak the
system of
order on a
structural
level

Totally
annihilate a
pre-existing
system of
order

Create legal
order from
scratch

Frequency

Most
common

Extremely
common

Very
common

Not very
common

Rare

Traffic
example

Allow traffic
conditions to
emerge
organically
and function
untouched by
regulation

Codify and
enforce the
existing
traffic
patterns that
have
emerged

Introduce
regulation to
modify the
flow of
traffic

Eliminate all
traffic from
the road
system (e.g.
pedestrianize
an entire
city)

Create an
entirely new
system of
transportation
(e.g. based on
light-rail
transit)

As can be seen in the table, the methodology of each of the strategies is
distinct. Non-interference simply allows the system of order to function
unhindered. Formalizing grants formal status to the system of order, usually
through the use of sanctions. Fine-tuning modestly tweaks the system on a
structural level (where doing so can achieve a greater degree of efficiency).
Dismantling completely eliminates an existing system of order, and Concocting
creates legal order from scratch. Hybrid strategies mentioned above, which
combine elements from two or more regulatory strategies, are also possible. For
example, logging is often restricted in designated areas for a fixed number of
years in order to avoid permanent deforestation but later allowed to resume.
This regulatory approach may be conceptualized as a hybrid strategy,
combining Dismantling and Fine-tuning: i.e. the system is totally eliminated
(Dismantling) yet allowed to later resume (Fine-tuning). The strategies also
differ with respect to how commonly they are invoked. What stands out is that
as we move along the continuum in the direction of legislative maximalism, the
strategies are employed less frequently. By far, Non-interference is the most
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common strategy. Formalizing is the next most common approach. Fine-tuning
is also a very common legislative tack. Indeed, the law spends a great deal of
its legislative energy here, tweaking pre-existing systems of order with a view
to making them more efficient-arguably, the vast majority of formal law deals
with natural ordering on this level of discourse. This is not at all the case for the
strategy of Dismantling, which is substantially less common. Yet the rarest of
these strategies is Concocting.
At the risk of straining our gardening metaphor to the point of snapping
(no pun intended): Non-interference is simply letting the plants grow;
Formalizing is comparable to reinforcing a growing plant by tethering it to a
stick or rod; Fine-tuning is minor weeding or trimming; and Dismantling is
completely uprooting a plant, tearing it out from its roots. Concocting does not
fit very well into our gardening metaphor. It is, I suppose, comparable to
artificially fabricating a plant, perhaps a plastic Christmas tree. In any case,
although imperfect, the metaphor captures the strategies available to the
legislative minimalist project. These five strategies represent a toolkit into
which policymakers can reach and pull out the most optimal legislative
strategy, with a view to minimizing unnecessary regulatory intrusion. A clear,
conceptually rigorous framework as to how to deal with customary social order
is not merely theoretically useful; it is arguably critical given the general trend
in the common law towards a greater reliance on statute.92 While the law
already deals in customary social order, it can benefit enormously from a heavy
dose of theoretical clarity so lawmakers can more skillfully work within a
minimalist framework.
B. Contract:A Paragonof Legislative Minimalism
Descending from the lofty heights of theory, this section examines our
taxonomy of strategies in the context of a concrete example-that of contract.
Contract is, in a sense, a paragon of legislative minimalism. Contract is perhaps
the one area of law where the minimalist approach is most evident. 93 As such, it
provides a magnificent case study. Exploring how the state deals with contract
may give us insight as to how legislative minimalism may be applied more
broadly. While the state's approach to contract is generally minimalist, this
minimalism is still tempered. The state adopts policies of Non-interference,
Formalizing, Fine-tuning, or even Dismantling depending upon the nature of

92

See, e.g., Gordon R. Woodman, Ghana: How Does State Law Accommodate Religious,

Cultural, Linguistic and Ethnic Diversity, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND THE LAW: STATE
RESPONSES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Marie-Claire Foblets ed., 2010) (discussing the trend in
Ghana toward supplementing common and customary law with legislation).
93
For an examination of minimalism in commercial contracts, see JONATHAN MORGAN,
CONTRACT LAW MINIMALISM: A FORMALIST RESTATEMENT OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW

(2013) (advocating a minimalist framework to the law of contract).
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the legal order that is created by the terms of the contract. Indeed, contract law
is a perfect case study for us as it exhibits most of the strategies of legislative
minimalism. Issues of substantive (as opposed to merely procedural) fairness,
among other public policy considerations, affect which form of minimalism is
invoked.94 Indeed, we see most of the strategies of legislative minimalism on
display when we examine how the state deals with contract. Contract is also an
ideal case study because it is the closest the law gets to institutionalizing the
creation of customary social order. Fuller described customary law as the
inarticulate older brother of contract. 95 I would be inclined to agree. As I
envision it here, a contract is a mini-system of order forged by the participants
themselves-each contract represents a tiny, self-contained system of bottomup order. The state intrudes upon these systems of order to different degrees,
yet the overarching spirit is unmistakably minimalist.
1. Non-Interference in Contract
In its general deference to freedom of contract, the state adopts an
overarching policy of Non-interference. 96 The contracting parties are free to
create the legal order that they wish, relatively unimpeded by the state, the
state's role being merely facilitative. 97 The classical model of contract assigns
the law a non-interventionist role. 98 The belief is that "parties should enter the
market, choose their fellow-contractors, set their own terms, strike their
bargains and stick to them." 99 The two linchpins of this approach are "the
doctrines of 'freedom of contract' and 'sanctity of contract."' l00 Vital to the
doctrine of freedom of contract is "term freedom."' 0 ' This is the principle that
the parties are free to set their own terms and at liberty to decide the subject
matter and substance of their contract. 102 The role of law is simply to identify
and enforce the parties' agreement. 0 3 Freedom of contract has, of course, been
significantly curtailed over the last century, as reflected in the neo-classical
model of contract. The growth of consumer protection, rent, and employment
legislation has put in place limitations on freedom of contract. Notwithstanding

94
95
96

MINDY CHEN-WISHART, CONTRACT LAW 13 (4th ed. 2012).
FULLER, supra note 49, at 176.
See CHEN-WISHART, supra note 94.

97

Id.at 10.

98

RICHARD STONE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACT 6 (9th ed. 2011).

99

EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 13 (5th ed. 2012).

1oo Id.
101 The other supporting principle here is "party freedom," i.e. the right to select with whom
one wishes to contract.
102

See MCKENDRICK, supra note 99.

103

See CHEN-WISHART, supra note 94.
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this, however, Non-interference remains a basic feature of contract law, as
enshrined in freedom of contract. 104
2. Formalizing in Contract
In that the state will generally enforce the terms of the contract (with
certain limitations), 10 5 the state engages in a policy of Formalizing. Indeed, the
state's role is to give effect to the parties' agreement through enforcement of
the contact's terms.106 The deference to customary self-ordering is
unmistakable. Where the parties' intentions are unclear, this willingness
extends to pre-existing custom. Extrinsic evidence of custom is admissible to
interpret written contracts with respect to which they are silent. 10 7 In such
cases, the courts have been more than willing to imply terms on the basis of
established trade customs.108 As already touched upon, beyond the particular
terms of the contract, the state has formalized numerous core principles that
initially arose bottom-up as informal rules within commercial communities,
such as the incorporation of notes and bills of exchanges. 109 The parol evidence
rule and the doctrine of completeness of writings are further examples of
Formalizing. 110

104

See

McKENDRICK,

supra note 99, at 294. For a classic analysis of the transformation of

freedom of contract in this respect, see ATIYAH, supra note 58. But see THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) (essays analyzing the resurgent interest in
freedom of contract). For the landmark case law regarding freedom of contract in the context of
employment legislation, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that setting a
limit to the hours a baker could work was an "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts
in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself
and his family"). Lockner is, however, no longer good law. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of minimum
wage legislation. West Coast Hotel Co. is regarded as having ended the Lochner-era of contract
law in America. West Coast Hotel Co. is an example of Fine-tuning (see below for a fuller
discussion). Both landmark rulings are excellent examples as they involve self-ordering in the
market, a forum where spontaneous order is often remarked upon.
105
See CHEN-WISHART, supra note 94.
107

Id. at 10, 14.
See, e.g., Hutton v. Warren, (1836) 1 M&W 460.

108

Id.

109

See

106

TRAKMAN,

supra note 63, at 23-27.

110 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1979) (setting out the common law

parol evidence rule); see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (2001).
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3. Fine-Tuning in Contract
Yet, the state's approach to contract is not completely hands-off.
Motivated by interests of fairness and social equity, the state also engages in
Fine-tuning. Implied terms are an excellent example of Fine-tuning. Here, we
have a deliberate intervention of the court or legislature to regulate the ordering
system (i.e. the terms of the contract) created by the parties with the goal of
improving the contract. Fine-tuning is captured more broadly in the neoclassical model of contract."' Minimum wage requirements are good examples
of Fine-tuning. While the self-ordering system regarding labor earnings in the
market place is left relatively untouched (parties are free to set salaries
commensurate with the skill level of workers), a floor is put in place in order to
correct inherent shortcomings in the system. This is similar to the example
given earlier regarding speeding: the system is left to self-order but within
prescribed limits. The law tweaks the self-ordering system of market pay along
the margins, enacting statutory minimum wage requirements that alter the wage
structure in order to achieve a socially preferable distribution of income. Many
theorists now question if such laws are, in fact, even effective in achieving
these goals. Minimum wage laws have been and continue to be highly
controversial and the subject of vigorous debate amongst economists, with
many arguing that minimum wage laws are not a good policy tool."' Minimum
wage laws are perhaps a good example of the potential for design error of topdown law when tinkering with a spontaneous system of order-in this case,
wage patterns in the market. The same story arguably applies to other forms of
direct regulation on voluntary exchange, such as family leave laws, sick leave
laws, other prescriptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, anti-discrimination
laws, union protections, and so on and so forth.
It is interesting to note how shifting norms and social conceptions of
value will determine what the law considers proper grounds for Fine-tuning.
Indeed, this is reflected writ large in the shift from a classical to neo-classical
model of contract law. Employment standards, a substantive part of
employment law, are simply customary norms regarding minimum socially
acceptable working conditions. Social norms invariably transform over time;
new normative rules emerge, replacing older normative standards. In all areas
of law, we can discern the transformative force of evolving custom impacting
existing values. However, the specific goals that a society deems worthwhile to
pursue are irrelevant to the present thesis in a technical sense: the objective
11
I12

See

supra note 94, at 11.
For an interesting book-length, empirically-rich discussion along these lines, see
CHEN-WISHART,

DAVID

(2008) (arguing that minimum wage laws
actually do not achieve the main objectives set out by their supporters). But see DAVID CARD &
ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
(1995) (arguing against the view that higher minimum wages reduce jobs for low-wage workers).
NEUMARK & WILLIAM L. WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES
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may be to rectify the social injustice of slavery or to institute it more broadly.
In any case, the methodology this paper advances remains the same. What is
offered here is a descriptive rather than a normative analysis-what is of
relevance is how lawmakers can implement the strategies of legislative
minimalism on a technical level. The decisive role that value positions will play
in this implementation is acknowledged yet remains immaterial to the present
thesis.
4. Dismantling and Concocting in Contract
The law also engages in Dismantling with regards to contract. For
example, vitiating factors, such as duress and unconscionability, can
completely invalidate a system of order established through contract. Contracts
that conflict with public policy, such as contracts to conduct illegal activity,
perceived gross immorality, or contracts of slavery, will be pointedly
dismantled by the state.11 3 A great illustration of Dismantling is anti-trust law.
Here, the self-ordering systems created by commercial cartels are
systematically dismantled under the neo-classical banner of maximizing social
welfare through competition. The state simply overrides such systems of selfordering, voiding agreements that restrict market competition. 114 Dismantling
in this form is seen as a matter of public policy: the system of self-order
(monopolistic collusion) is deemed to be detrimental. In some jurisdictions, this
is true even where price-fixing and other horizontal restraints (such as group
boycotts and market division) are a mostly spontaneous arrangement with
absolutely no explicit arrangements to engage in price manipulation. In such
jurisdictions, even tacit collusion (also termed conscious parallelism) is, in
principle, sufficient to warrant antitrust enforcement. 115 Tacit collusion, unlike
cartels, is not criminalized, yet is, "in principle, . . . subject to antitrust
enforcement."1' 16 Indeed, in the case of tacit collusion, coordinated behavior

113

See CHEN-WISHART, supra note 94, at 12.

114

Under U.S. law, section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "every contract, combination

in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .. " 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2012). Under EU law, the Treaty of Lisbon prohibits anti-competitive agreements, rendering
any such agreements automatically void. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union art. 101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88-89 [hereinafter TFEU].
115 For example, under EU law, tacit collusion could come under the Lisbon Treaty, Article
101 "concerted practices," as well as the principle of "collective dominance" under Article 102.
TFEU, supra note 114, art. 101-02.
116

PETER DAVIS & ELIANA GARCtS, QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COMPETITION AND

(2009). Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, however, tacit collusion
is not deemed sufficient to justify state intervention because section 1 requires proof of
agreement (conspiracy). 15 U.S.C. § 1; see also Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969) (arguing that antitrust law should
regulate consciously parallel oligopoly behavior); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 53-55
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 316
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emerges in an entirely spontaneous fashion without the need for explicit
communication
of any kind-a classic illustration of a system of spontaneous
11 7
self-ordering.
In regard to the strategy of Concocting, we find very little evidence of
this in contract. Among the various areas of law, this brand of maximalism is
not readily identifiable in contract. This is because state regulation of contract
leans so much in the direction of minimalism that full-fledged Concocting as a
strategy does not make an appearance. Arguably, some standard form contracts
with government agencies where specific terms must be included as a matter of
law might be considered as forms of Concocting. Yet this does not meet the
criteria of Concocting in its purest sense, i.e. the wholesale construction of a
system of order.
Stepping back for a moment, it is important to note that the tactics of
legislative minimalism are not restricted to contract. What we do in contract
may be applied in all areas of law. Where the line of legislative intrusion
should be drawn will unavoidably be affected by normative considerations;
however, this long-standing debate need not concern us. We are merely
providing a conceptual framework for policymakers who wish to boost system
efficiency. Where formal law should step in will often remain open to debate
and turn on normative considerations. However, regardless of where one stands
in this ideological feud, the chance of design error increases the more we
wander away from minimalism. This is not a normative appraisal; it is a factual
contention, at least it is the working premise of this Article. From a practical
perspective, however, it is not always easy for legislatures to know which
strategy is most suitable-for example, when Formalizing is more appropriate
than Fine-tuning, or Concocting more appropriate than Dismantling.
Ultimately, this will turn on the specific system of order that is being
confronted. However, general guidelines can be of enormous help here.
Wherever feasible, minimalism should be our starting point-that minimalism
is preferable should be a presumption for policymakers. However, where a
system of order seems to be failing, or producing unacceptable externalities
(this will invariably turn on normative considerations), regulation is necessary.
Ever higher degrees of legislative intervention should then be implemented
until the situation is sufficiently remedied. To use once more a metaphor: if the
construction of a house is defective, the most sensible line of attack is to see if
the problem is resolvable through minor tinkering; one should not immediately

(2d ed. 2001) (explaining why tacit collusion did not come to constitute monopolistic practice
under U.S. law).
117
See DAVIS & GARCES, supra note 116, at 315 (discussing the idea that coordinated behavior
may emerge even without the need for explicit communication); see also HERVI

DUMEZ & ALAIN
JEUNEMAITRE, UNDERSTANDING AND REGULATING THE MARKET AT A TIME OF GLOBALIZATION:

THE CASE OF THE CEMENT INDUSTRY 98-101

(2000) (discussing spontaneous coordination in the

cement industry through the exchange of information).
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rip out the foundations of the building and start anew. Adjustments and minor
replacements should be first attempted, increasing the level of intrusion only as
necessary. Indeed, it may become clear that we, in fact, need to rip up the
foundations of the house; however, this should be our last, not our first, course
of action. Through incremental legislation, it is possible to hone in on the
appropriate degree of intrusion.
C. Beyond Law: A Wide Breadth of PotentialApplication
Before concluding our discussion, one final point should be briefly
made. It is important to appreciate that this taxonomy has a wide breadth of
potential application. These strategies are not simply limited to the case of legal
order; they arise wherever top-down planning attempts to deal with any system
of spontaneous order (to use Hayek's term). The same basic approaches arise
in, for example, biology, economics, ecology, urban planning, linguistics,
chemistry, material sciences, and transportation, to name but a few examples.
In all cases, the planner can choose to not interfere with the pattern (Noninterference), reinforce the pattern (Formalizing), redirect or tweak the pattern
(Fine-tuning), destroy the pattern (Dismantling), or fabricate a pattern
(Concocting). Because systems of spontaneous order surround us, indeed,
because life itself is such a system, as autonomous agents standing outside this
ordering (to the extent that this is possible), our interactions with spontaneous
order are limited to one or more of these five approaches. These are the only
options before us. 118 While our focus here was legal order, exploring how these
strategies may be applied in other non-legal contexts may prove quite
fascinating. We could see terms such as ecological minimalism, urban
minimalism, medical minimalism, psychiatric minimalism, and so on and so
forth." 9 Indeed, it offers a stunningly broad scope of potential application. I
leave such avenues of research to those more qualified than I to explore;
however, the basic taxonomy for this examination is provided.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the paper posited a framework for adopting legislative
minimalism, the result is not so much a fully-developed theory of how to
legislatively deal with customary social order; rather, it provides the framework
for one. Indeed, a more intricate methodology could be crafted from this basic
model. For the purposes of examination, I assumed the argument regarding
informational complexity as valid. (I took what I felt to be the strongest
technical argument against centralized design.) This is, of course, open to

118
119

I am including here the various hybrid strategies that are possible.
Some of these terms are already in use; however, not in the sense meant here.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/5

36

Druzin: Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to Shrink the

2014]

RESTRAINING THE HAND OF LAW

debate, but it would be intellectually reckless to simply dismiss it out of hand. I
cannot help but think that the temptation to do so is often motivated more by
political ideology than intellectual certainty. In any case, if upon examination
we determine that minimalism is indeed what we want, the framework I
constructed here is a strategic, balanced way to get us there.
The core idea of legislative minimalism is that we could go further in
the direction of regulatory non-intrusiveness, trusting instead the self-patterning
nature of customary social order. To capture the concept in one simple phrase,
it is this: the least amount of law possible. This is the benefit of legislative
minimalism: it allows for legislative parsimony. We can soften the hand of law.
Yet this is always to be judged cautiously on a case-by-case basis. In some
circumstances, we will not be able to break too far in the direction of
minimalism; in others, we will be able to engage in extremely high degrees of
it. Like any other form of natural ordering, while customary social ordering
stands a far better chance of avoiding design inefficiency, it is not always
perfect. The system can sometimes generate sub-optimal outcomes, and so we
often need to modify it to some degree-we do this in medicine, in agriculture,
etc. Cancer cells are the outcome of a natural system as are floods, but we do
not hesitate to treat tumors and build flood walls. Social order is no different.
Yet this must be done with the utmost humility, aware of our cognitive
limitations and mindful that the majority of the time we are but fumbling in the
darkness. The hope is that the conceptual framework offered here may serve as
a foundation for theorists to build upon and better position policymakers to
adopt such a tack so they may fashion leaner, more honed legislation,
conceptually clear as to what exactly it is they are doing.
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